The End of the Encryption Foundation: Organizational Structure of a New Era

The encryption foundation once played an important role in promoting the development of blockchain networks, but has now become a major obstacle to the industry's development. With the emergence of new regulatory frameworks in the US Congress, the encryption industry has ushered in an opportunity to abandon the encryption foundation model and restructure the ecosystem.

The encryption foundation initially stemmed from the decentralized idealism of early founders, aiming to act as a neutral manager of network resources. However, with changes in the regulatory environment and market competition, this model gradually deviated from its original intention. It not only failed to achieve effective benefit synergy but also led to issues such as growth optimization failure and the entrenchment of control.

The encryption foundation model has multiple flaws:

1. Improper incentive mechanism: lack of clear accountability mechanisms and market constraints.
2. Legal and economic constraints: Limited the ability to develop peripheral products and commercial activities.
3. Low operational efficiency: The teams that should collaborate have been artificially split.
4. Centralization tendency: Evolving into centralized entities that control key resources and decision-making power.

In contrast, conventional development companies provide a better vehicle for the continuous construction and maintenance of networks. The company structure can more efficiently allocate capital, attract talent, and respond quickly to market demands.

To address potential conflicts of interest, the following tools can be used:

1. Public Welfare Company ( PBC ) Structure: Balancing profit and public interest objectives.
2. Network Revenue Sharing Mechanism: Create continuous incentives through revenue distribution.
3. Milestone Attribution Mechanism: Linking token locking with network development goals.
4. Contract Protection Terms: Prevent actions that harm the interests of token holders.
5. Programmatic Incentive System: Rewarding diverse participants in the network.

On the implementation level, the decentralized non-legal non-profit association (DUNA) and the cybernetic organization (BORG) provide an efficient path for the new framework. DUNA grants legal entity status to the DAO, while BORG realizes the on-chain migration of governance functions.

As the industry matures, encryption projects require more authentic governance, more substantial collaboration, and more systematic operations. The future encryption ecosystem will be built on a scalable system that possesses real incentives, real accountability, and real decentralization.